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Abstract  
This paper analyzes the impact of news, oil prices, and international financial market 
developments on daily returns on Russian bond and stock markets. First, regarding 
returns, energy news affects returns, while news from the war in Chechnya is not 
significant. Market volatility does not appear to be sensitive to either type of news. 
Second, a significant effect of the growth in oil prices on Russian stock returns is 
detected. Third, the international influence on Russian financial markets depends 
upon the degree of financial liberalization. The higher the degree of financial 
liberalization, the stronger is the impact of U.S. stock returns on Russian financial 
markets. In addition, banking reform and interest rate liberalization efforts seem to 
dictate the globalization of Russian stock markets, while it is the progress in 
liberalizing securities markets and non-bank financial institutions that matters more 
for the globalization of Russian bond markets.  
 
JEL:     C5, G12, G15, F36. 
Keywords:  financial market behavior, financial market integration, stock market 




Russia is one of the biggest emerging markets. Other emerging markets, such as those 
in Asia and South America, are extensively studied. Despite its sheer size, potential 
importance for global investors, and significant major financial reforms implemented during 
the early phase of transition, only a few empirical studies examine financial markets in 
Russia. It is interesting to analyze Russian financial markets for several reasons. First, 
financial market behavior in Russia can be different than in other emerging markets due to 
historical, cultural, and institutional factors. Second, Russian markets may offer better 
diversification benefits (Rockinger and Urga, 2000). Third, since the early 1990s, Russian 
policy makers have implemented major economic and financial reforms, resulting in the 
emergence of new financial instruments. A related question in this respect is whether 
investors in this market react to “news” in a similar fashion as those in advanced market 
economies. Fourth, because Russia is rich in energy resources, oil price shocks may have 
destabilizing effects on domestic financial markets. Fifth, a significant drawback with respect 
to financial market liberalization took place in 1998, and it is interesting to analyze the 
consequences of this development for the internationalization of Russian financial markets.  
This paper contributes to the literature in several significant ways. First, it examines 
financial market behavior in Russia in response to “news”. To do so, we construct a set of 
news events that might be of particular importance to investors in Russia and then test market 
reactions to such information arrival in both stock and bond markets. Information arrival is a 
building block of many theoretical models of asset price determination. The mixture of 
distributions model (MODM) and the recent microstructure theories rely on public 
information arrival to explain movements in asset returns.
1 Although the empirical evidence 
on linking public information to asset market behavior is still accumulating, the main focus 
                                                 
1 MODM models are associated with Clark (1973) and Tauchen and Pitts (1983), while microstructure theories 
are reviewed in O’Hara (1995) and Lyons (2001).  
has been on industrial countries.
2 Thus, our paper, providing evidence on the importance of 
public information arrival contained in energy and war news in Russian financial markets, has 
implications for this line of literature. 
Second, it tests the degree of integration of Russian financial markets into the world 
markets. As a result of the trade and financial liberalization measures in the mid 1990s, the 
Russian economy has become linked to the global economy. Therefore, it is important to 
observe the sensitivity of Russian financial markets to global market developments. This issue 
has significant implications not only for policymakers but also for global investors. The 
growing importance of the integration of domestic markets with the world market diminishes 
opportunities for global investors to reduce overall portfolio risk through diversification, 
resulting in the possibility of contagion in times of crisis. Regulatory policies may be needed 
to reduce the potentially negative effects of contagion on the domestic economy (Gelos and 
Sahay, 2001). To address the issue of spillovers from international financial markets onto 
Russian markets, we employ data on U.S. stock and bond market returns.
3 We can test 
whether U.S. financial variables Granger-cause their Russian counterparts. If we find such a 
relationship, then one can argue that the domestic financial markets in Russia have become 
vulnerable to global financial developments. We also investigate the existence of spillover 
effects of U.S. financial market developments on Russian financial market volatility. Finally, 
we investigate the stability of the linkage between world and Russian financial markets, with 
an emphasis on the situation after the financial crisis in August 1998.  
The Russian economy has rich energy resources. Exports make up about 33 percent of 
GDP, and about 50 percent of export revenues come from the energy sector, especially oil 
(Rautava, 2002). As an important source of global risk, changes in the world oil prices are 
therefore expected to significantly affect economic activity in Russia and may disturb the 
                                                 
2 Melvin and Yin (2000) and Edmonds and Kutan (2002) provide a review of recent work. 
3 We employ U.S. data in this paper to represent “global” market developments because the U.S. is the most 
important economy and considered to be a key investor in the Russian economy.  
financial market activity 
4 As our third objective, this paper thus provides initial evidence 
about the role of oil price fluctuations in Russian bond and stock markets.  
In the next section, we summarize previous work on this topic. Sections III and IV 
describe the construction of news events, the data used, and the econometric approach. In 
sections V and VI we report our empirical results for bond and stock markets, respectively. 
The last section concludes the paper and discusses policy implications of our findings. 
 
II.  Related literature and our contribution 
Only a few empirical studies examine financial market issues in Russia. Gelos and 
Sahay (2001) investigate the impact of Russian stock market movements on a set of central 
and eastern European stock markets during the recent Russian crisis and find significant 
contagion effects. Using a panel data that includes Russia and five central and eastern 
European economies, Christoffersen and Sløk (2000) test the predictive power of asset prices 
for real activity and report that asset price movements Granger-cause output growth. 
Rockinger and Urga (2000) test the predictability and efficiency of the Russian and central 
European stock markets. Regarding Russia, they conclude that market returns are highly 
correlated, indicating significant persistency in returns and predictability. With respect to the 
market efficiency, they cannot draw strong conclusions.
5 In addition, they report that stock 
returns exhibit ARCH effects.  
In this paper, we investigate the impact information arrival and oil price changes on 
the Russian stock and bond markets in a consistent econometric set-up. An important feature 
of our study is the detailed analysis of the influence of world market developments on Russian 
financial markets. In particular, we study the impact of the 1998 financial crisis on the global 
integration of Russian markets. We use the financial liberalization index published by the 
                                                 
4 Rautava (2002) provides evidence that oil price fluctuations have a significant impact on the Russian economy. 
5 They argue that the predictability does not necessarily imply inefficiency because the former may be due to 
either risk premium or lack of liquidity in the market.   
EBRD to examine how the level of financial market liberalization has affected the integration 
of Russian markets with world markets. Compared to the existing work, our study provides a 
more comprehensive analysis of Russian financial markets. 
 
III. Construction  of  news 
The construction of news events is the most labor-intensive part of the data 
preparations. We use two examples of explicit news events in our study.
6 First, we choose a 
category of economic news that is likely to be of great importance to investors. We use energy 
news because the Russian economy is heavily dependent upon the energy sector. Thus, over 
the sample period from September 1995 to November 2001, we systematically sieve through 
the irregularly published public announcements available on the yahoo website of daily news, 
http://dailynews.yahoo.com/fc/World/Russia/ and collect relevant news related to the 
energy sector. We categorize the “news” into three different types: news that is good, neutral, 
or bad for the energy sector. Table 1 provides an overview of these news categories, their 
definitions and the number of events in our sample. The news categories are translated into 
(0,1) dummy variables for the purpose of empirical analysis. We make sure that results are 
fairly robust with respect to news that is difficult to classify. In all estimations, we use the 
event dates. 
Second, employing the same data source and methodology, we choose an area of 
political news that takes up a lot of space in the international media, namely the war in 
Chechnya. The hypothesis here is that, if Russia winning the war, it may be good news for the 
Russian economy, as it might signal an end to the conflict. Moreover, we think that a victory 
by Chechnya or a continuation of the conflict is bad for Russian financial markets. Based on 
this classification, we construct again three categories of war news; namely good, neutral, and 
                                                 
6 Hayo and Kutan (2004) provide an extensive analysis of the effect of IMF news on emerging financial markets, 
including Russia.   
bad. Neutral news captures miscellaneous information about the conflict that can neither be 
classified as good or bad news. 
 
IV.  Data and econometric methodology 
The dependent variables in our study are daily closing stock and bond returns for 
Russia over the time period from 1 September 1995 to 30 November 2001. Daily returns are 
expresses in percentage terms. The stock data are obtained from the website of the Russian 
Trading System (RTS) http://www.rts.ru/engl/rts/index_dhist.stm
7, while the bond data are 
available from Morgan Stanley’s “Emerging Market Bond Index“ website, 
http://www2.jpmorgan.com/MarketDataInd/EMBI/embi.html.
8 
  To examine the globalization of Russian markets, we include data on U.S. Standard & 
Poors Stock and the three-month U.S. bond price returns in our estimations. The data are 
obtained from the Yahoo finance website, http://finance.yahoo.com/ and expressed in 
percentages as well. In estimations, we use one-day lagged values for U.S returns due to the 
different time zones in the U.S. and Russia. To measure the impact of oil price changes on 
financial markets in Russia, we include the daily growth rate (in %) of the crude oil (spot) 
price.
9 The oil data were obtained from the website of the United States Energy Information 
Administration.
10 
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. The average returns in the U.S. and 
Russian stock markets are quite similar, while the nominal daily return on the Russian bond 
market is much higher than its U.S. counterpart. Russian financial markets, in particular the 
bond market, are much more volatile than U.S. markets. The standard deviation of Russian 
                                                 
7 Following previous studies, we utilize the RTS index, which includes stocks of the largest and most liquid 
companies and reflects the general trends in the Russian stock market quite well. 
8 Due to the Russian crisis in 1998 and the resulting debt default, complete data on the domestic bond market are 
not available. Therefore, we have decided to use this emerging market bond yield for Russia. 
9 We also experimented with the premium on oil price futures for various time horizons but were unable to 




bond returns is more than 25 times higher than that of U.S. bond returns, while the standard 
deviation is only about three times higher in the case of the stock markets.  
Russian and U.S. financial market returns series exhibit excess kurtosis but not much 
skewness, and the distributions show clear evidence of ARCH effects (Engle, 1982). 
Rockinger and Urga (2000) also report that stock returns in Russia exhibit ARCH effects. The 
existence of ARCH effects implies that classical methods of estimation are not efficient. To 
take the volatility clustering into account, we employ the GARCH model developed by 
Bollerslev (1986) and some variants of it.  
A specification that works well for both bond and stock markets in Russia with regard 
to capturing ARCH effects is a GARCH (1,1) model. In the actual estimation we proceed 
using a consistent general-to-specific modelling approach (see Hendry, 1995). This ensures 
that the inferences based on statistical tests are valid throughout the modelling process.  
The general specification is as follows: 
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where α, β, µ, κ1, κ2, δ, γ, ϕ, λ, and φ are parameters respectively vectors of parameters, τ is 
an indicator function as defined in the last line above, and εt|Γt-1= t[ν]; with Γt-1 capturing all 
information up to t-1, and t[ν] a t-distribution with ν degrees of freedom. 
The general specification, as represented by Equation 1, is an autoregressive-
distributed lag model with six lags that allows for a number of special features. First, student-t 
distributed errors (Bollerslev, 1987) are assumed that can provide a better approximation to 
residuals that are not normally distributed. Second, the variance enters the mean equation  
(Engle et al., 1987). We can thereby test whether volatility, a measure of risk, is priced in 
Russian markets. Asymmetric effects of shocks (Engle and Ng, 1993), defined as last periods 
forecast errors, are included in the model if κ1 is significantly different from zero. In addition, 
asymmetry thresholds (Glosten et al., 1993) are captured when κ2 is not equal to zero. Finally, 
we include monthly dummies to control for seasonal effects. 
Testing is undertaken by employing the robust standard errors developed by Bollerslev 
and Wooldridge (1992) to account for the non-normality of the returns (Table 2). Although 
the sample period runs from 1 September 1995 to 30 November 2001, we employ data until 
end of August 2001 to save the last two months for out-of-sample analyses (35 observations). 
This not only allows to evaluate the stability of our estimated models in general but also to 
test whether the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 
September 2001 had a significant impact on the data generating process.  
 
V.  Analyzing bond returns 
Effects on bond returns 
We start off the modelling process with the model for daily bond returns. Here we 
encountered a problem related to the observation on 23 October 1997, having a strong 
influence on the outcome of ARCH tests. In view of our large sample size, we see no major 
disadvantage of adding an impulse dummy to the model that effectively removes this 
problem.
11 In addition, the out-of-sample tests would reveal any detrimental effects that this 
might have on the forecasting ability of our model. Then, reducing the number of variables 
and special features in a consistent testing-down process (Chi
2(41) = 30), we arrive at a more 
parsimonious model, which is presented in column two of Table 3. It is a threshold 
GARCH(1,1) model with student t(5)-distributed errors. Note that the volatility of returns 
                                                 
11 There was a meeting of the CIS (Community of Independent States) countries taking place in Moldowa around 
this time. On this specific day an announcement was made that the leaders of the participating countries are 
unable to agree to any meaningful perspective of this organisation for the future.   
does not exhibit a significant influence on mean returns (GARCH-M) and was therefore 
removed as part of the testing down process that we employ.  
We find that all parameters of the GARCH(1,1) terms are significant, confirming  the 
evidence reported in Rockinger and Urga (2000) for the Russian stock market. A sufficient 
condition for the conditional variance ht to be non-negative is that α0, α1, and β1 are non-
negative, which is fulfilled here. Moreover, the sum of α1 and β1 is significantly less than 
unity (Chi
2(1) = 5.18*), ruling out that the model is an integrated GARCH (see Nelson, 1990).  
The data appear to be closer to a student-t distribution than a normal distribution. In 
particular, the estimate of the degrees of freedom of the student-t points towards a distribution 
with five degrees of freedom, which has fatter tails than a normal distribution. However, 
diagnostic testing (see lower part of Table 3) reveals that this distribution is not able to 
sufficiently remove the non-normality. Thus, modeling the t-distribution primarily contributes 
to an improvement in the fit of the model, while we still have to adjust the resulting standard 
errors using robust standard errors based on Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992).The other 
diagnostics tests for the bond equation indicate the estimate model completely accounts for 
ARCH effects and autocorrelation in returns. 
With regard to the remaining variables, we find that the first lag of the dependent 
variable is significant. This implies that Russian returns are predictable using yesterday’s 
returns. Hence, (weak) market efficiency appears to be violated on Russian bond markets. The 
degree of persistence is not very high, though, as the lagged dependent variable takes on a 
value of less than 0.10. It might well be the case, as argued by Rockinger and Urga (2000) 
that this reflects varying risk premia and thin markets rather than a violation of market 
efficiency.  
In addition, there is a significant influence of U.S. markets. Surprisingly, it is not the 
U.S. bond market that shows an influence but the U.S. stock market. A one-percentage point 
increase in S&P returns lead to an increase of Russian bond returns by 20 basis points. Thus,  
U.S. financial markets Granger-cause Russian bond markets. The economic effects are twice 
as strong as those of the lagged Russian bond returns.  
We find some evidence for threshold asymmetry (Glosten et al., 1993). It implies that 
negative forecast errors last period have a larger impact on the current volatility of the 
Russian bond market than positive ones. This can also be interpreted as unspecified negative 
news, which is being captured in the forecast error, having more influence than unspecified 
positive news. The problem with this approach is that the forecast error may reflect all sorts of 
influences, in particular, weaknesses in the econometric model, and not only news. We think 
that this is a serious problem, and continue our analysis using the explicit news categories as 
described above. 
Starting with energy news, we observe that there is a clear difference in the way the 
content of news affects bond returns. Neutral energy news influences the market in no 
significant way. On the other hand, positive (negative) news raises (lower) market returns, 
suggesting that the content of news plays an important role.  
The impact of good and bad news is not only of statistical importance but also of 
economic one, as good news increases bond returns by about one percentage point and bad 
news decreases returns by about the same amount. This influence is five times higher than the 
effect of U.S. S&P returns on Russian returns. We cannot reject the symmetry hypothesis, in 
absolute terms, of the impact of good and bad news on bond returns (Chi
2(1) = 0.01). Given 
the size of the coefficients, it seems worthwhile to test the estimates against the hypothesis of 
a unit influence of news on bond returns. We cannot reject these hypotheses (Chi
2(2) = 0.02). 
Therefore, we conclude that good (bad) energy news raises (lowers) daily stock returns by one 
percentage point.  
Moving the analysis to war news in the bonds equation, Table 3 reveals that none of 
the coefficients are statistically significant. Thus, the Chechnya war news has no noticeable  
impact on bond market returns. This suggests that investors already discounted the impact of 
the war news. 
12  
 
Determinants of bond market volatility  
A key related question is whether news variables enter the standard GARCH variance 
equation of bonds returns significantly (see Bollerslev and Ghyssels, 1996).
13 Starting with 
news, we construct a dummy variable that takes the value of one if either war or energy news 
occurs. No effect on volatility can be found (robust t-value = -1.00). Then we include each 
category of news separately in the variance equation, and we neither find a significant 
impact.
14 Thus, it appears that these news categories affect only mean returns. 
Next, we consider other variables that might affect the variance equation. In particular, 
we assess the impact of the oil price and spillover effects from U.S. financial markets. Again, 
we do not find any significant impact of these variables on bond market volatility. We also 




Dynamic effects of news on bond market 
To get a better idea about the dynamic effects of news on financial markets in Russia, 
we analyze the situation in a plus/minus one day window around the event day (see Table 4). 
This provides information on bond market returns the day before news come in. For example, 
news may leak the day before the official announcements. It also allows us to draw some 
conclusions about the persistence of the effects set in motion by the news events beyond the 
                                                 
12 It is also noteworthy to mention that the inclusion of the news variables does not noticeably affect the 
estimates of the other model parameters. 
13 We also considered modeling within an EGARCH framework (Nelson, 1991) as a further robustness check. It 
turned out, however, that we do not get converging estimates for this class of models. The reason for these 
problems can be traced to the presence of the “news” dummy variables, which cause serious problems for the 
optimization algorithms (Doornik and Ooms, 2002). 
14 In fact, with energy news alone in the variance equation, the model does not converge.  
15 To conserve space, we do not report these regressions in detail. All omitted results are available upon request.   
announcement days. War news is insignificant and the following discussion thus centers on 
energy news.  
Starting with good energy news, the bond market is showing average positive returns 
on the day before the event. On the announcement day, returns increase significantly by one 
percentage point. One day later, the bond market is below average, indicating a (partial) loss 
of the gains during the announcement day. Thus, good news does not seem to be anticipated 
by previous day’s prices. Moreover, gains in returns are not sustained over the next day.  
In the case of bad energy news, we find that on the day before the announcement, the 
bond market is significantly below average. On the news day we observe, again in accordance 
with our previous results, a statistically significant reduction in returns by one percentage 
point. This loss is then (partially) reversed on the day after the event, as bond markets perform 
above average. Thus, bad energy news seems to be anticipated by market participants. 
Expectation formation appears to be positively biased, though, as returns drop even more 
substantially on the announcement day. The (partial) recovery during the next day may either 
indicate that the drop on the announcement day was an overreaction or that other news came 
in that, to a certain extent, compensated the impact of bad energy news. 
 
Stability of estimated model over time 
First, given the reduced model for bond returns from Table 3, we want to assess the 
out-of-sample performance. Figure 1 provides forecasts and their 95% confidence intervals 
for the months September and October 2001. Note that about one working week of data are 
missing after 10 September. Although there is one observation (4 September 2001) outside 
the confidence bands, in general the model performs satisfactory. Thus, the estimated 
equation appears to be stable even during a time of financial upheaval.  
Next, we analyze in-sample stability and changes in correlations over time. We 
include yearly dummy variables to cover significant changes in returns over the sample  
period. Looking at the individual estimates, we find that 1998 was a particularly bad year for 
bond returns while 1999 was a good year. It turns out, however, that these year effects are 
neither individually nor jointly significant (Chi
2(6) = 6.36).  
Concentrating on the international integration of the Russian bonds market, we ask 
whether the influence of the S&P index was changing over the sample. To do so, U.S. returns 
are interacted with the yearly dummy variables, allowing for a different parameter in every 
period.  We then re-estimate the model in Table 3 and we can reject the hypothesis that the 
parameter on the S&P index is the same in every year (Chi
2(7) = 71.2). It turns out that the 
bond returns show deviations from the mean effect particularly in 1998 (coefficient: -0.005), 
but also to a lesser extent in 2001 (coefficient: 0.07). The U.S. influence on the Russian bonds 
market was not significantly different from zero in these periods. In other words, during these 
years the Russian bonds market was not reacting to world financial markets.  
  This finding begs the question of why we observe such a result. A well-known event 
during the sample period was the Russian financial crisis on 17 August 1998, when the 
Russian authorities decided to abandon support for the ruble and announced a 90-day 
moratorium on commercial external debt payments. To test the hypothesis that the 
international linkage of Russian financial markets weakened as a result of the crisis, we 
include a dummy variable taking on a value of zero before September 1998 and of one after. 
This variable turns out to be not significant, however. We then interact this dummy variable 
with the S&P index and add it to the regression, while keeping the crisis dummy variable in 
regressions. We find no significant influence on the effect of the S&P index on Russian bond 
returns. This is perhaps not entirely surprising, given our finding that the coefficient on the 
S&P index was particularly low in 1998 and 2001. In addition, the inclusion of a step dummy 
alone is not based on sound economic reasoning and does not address the question of why the 
crisis should have long-lasting effects.   
To address these questions, we propose to use an indicator for financial liberalization 
published by the EBRD in its Transition Report. It takes values from 1 to 4+. Higher values 
would represent progress towards a higher level of financial market liberalization as found in 
most advanced economies. Over our sample period period, the values are as given in Table 5.  
The hump-shaped time profile of this indicator suggests that the transition of Russian 
financial markets suffered a severe blow in 1998 that lasted till the end of the sample period in 
2001. Thus, instead of further progress, the period after the crisis is characterized by a 
reduction in bank solvency and a declining activity of banks and other financial institutions in 
market-oriented lending. All in all, there is a shrinking of financial market activities, both by 
banks and by enterprises issuing commercial papers. In our view, this deterioration in market 
activity led to the reduced global integration of Russian financial markets.  
Including the financial liberalization index in the base model of Table 3 for the bond 
market gives no statistically significant results. When this variable is interacted with the S&P 
index, keeping the S&P index and the transition indicator in the model, provides results 
significant for the interacted term at a 10% level, while the original S&P index shows a 
marginal significance level of 0.95. After removing the S&P variable and the transition 
indicator (Chi
2(2) = 1.97) from the model, we get a significantly positive coefficient for the 
interacted variable in the model (coefficient: 0.095, t-value: 7.34**). This implies that the 
influence of U.S. returns on the Russian bonds market is stronger when financial liberalization 
is higher.  
To better understand the impact of financial liberalization, we utilize the two 
components of the financial liberalization index: (1) banking reform and interest rate 
liberalization and (2) securities markets and non-bank financial institutions. Corresponding to 
the analysis above, we now generate two interaction variables with the S&P and these sub-
indices. Re-running the base model, while including the sub-indices and their interaction with 
the U.S. financial market, does not allow us to reject that the original S&P index returns, its  
interaction with the banking liberalization indicator, and the sub-indices themselves are zero. 
We hence conclude that the S&P returns affects Russian stock market returns strongly only 
when non-banking liberalization is high. Based on these results, we note that the break-down 
of security issuance as a means of financing during and after the financial crisis contributed to 
a reduction in the globalization of Russian bond markets. We also investigated the 
consequences of interacting the other variables in Table 3 with the liberalization index, but we 
did not uncover any significant relationships.  
 
Further robustness checks 
Given the importance of oil prices for the Russian economy, and the significant impact 
of energy news on bond returns, one can conjecture that perhaps the volatility of oil prices 
affects returns as well. To test this hypothesis, we generate estimates of oil price volatility in 
several ways, namely for oil prices themselves and growth rates, using both a GARCH and an 
EGARCH specification.
16 As it turns out, none of these four indicators for oil price volatility 
shows a significant influence on bond markets. These results, also not reported for space 
considerations, suggest that market participants already discounted the impact of high energy 
price volatility on bond returns. 
 
VI.  Analyzing stock returns 
Effects on stock returns 
Next, we analyze the Russian stock market (see Table 3). The modeling strategy is 
similar to the bond market. The sum of the GARCH(1,1) coefficients is again below unity but 
not significantly so.
17 The testing-down of variables in the general model of the stock market 
                                                 
16 Given the non-stationarity of oil prices, we reject the sum of GARCH(1,1) coefficients to be below unity.  
17 We re-estimate the reduced model as an EGARCH. This leaves the other results unaffected but now we can 
statistically reject the hypothesis of an IGARCH at a 5% level. We stick to the original GARCH specification in 
Table 3, though, as we use a general-to-specific approach and an EGARCH for the general model shows no sign 
of convergence.  
equation leads to a more parsimonious model with regard to the GARCH features than the 
bond equation (Chi
2(40) = 37.6). For stock market, we cannot find any trace of threshold 
asymmetry. The degree of non-normality is relatively less severe.  
Regarding the variables in the model, as consistent with findings of Rockinger and 
Urga (2000), we observe persistence in stock returns as well. The degree of persistence is 
larger than in the case of bond returns, but it is not very high. Again, we find evidence for the 
S&P index to influence Russian markets. This time, a one percentage point increase in U.S. 
stock market returns raises Russian stock returns by 0.52 percentage points after the first 
period. This impact is twice as large as in the case of the bonds equation, and more than three 
times higher than the impact of lagged stock returns.  
We now keep the first lag of the oil price growth in the equation, following the testing-
down process. A one percent increase in the oil price raises stock prices by about one-tenth of 
a percentage point. This effect is not strong in economic terms. It is only about 20% of the 
impact that the U.S. financial markets have on Russian stock returns. 
However, this time we do not find any significant news effect in the model. There is 
neither an asymmetry of forecast errors on the conditional variance nor is there an influence 
of the explicit news categories referring to energy news and Chechnya war news on stock 
returns.  
 
Determinants of volatility on stock market 
Although we do not find that any of the news categories affect stock returns in the 
reduced model, it might very well be the case that they influence volatility. Thus, we test for 
the impact of news, the oil price, and spillover effects from U.S. markets on stock market 
volatility. Starting with the influence of news on volatility, we neither find an effect of an 
aggregate news dummy (robust t-value = -0.50) in the variance equation, nor do we discover  
significant effects related to the disaggregated news categories. The same result holds for oil 
price growth or its square.  
When considering U.S. stock market returns, we discover a significantly negative 
influence (robust t-value = -2.31*). In other words, higher U.S. returns appear to reduce the 
volatility of the Russian stock market. This sign is expected because new information arrival 
decreases the information disparity in the market, reducing potential speculative trading 
activities and hence volatility. We get significantly positive effects when including squared 
values of U.S. stock market returns (robust t-value = 2.76**). As the latter measures the 
volatility of the U.S. market, the positive sign indicates “direct” volatility linkages between 
the two markets. While the sign of the effects depends on the specification, we find that there 
are “information” spillover effects from U.S. stock markets developments onto Russian stock 
market volatility. These results suggest that market participants in Russia pay attention to 
developments in U.S. markets.  
 
Dynamic effects of news on stock market 
As in the case of bond markets, we analyze the dynamic structure of information 
arrival, using a plus/minus one day window around the announcement day (see Table 4). As 
in Table 3, war news does not show a significant impact. For good energy news, there is no 
significant effect on any one of the three days. In the case of bad energy news, however, we 
find that on the day before the announcement, the market shows returns that are negative but 
statistically indistinguishable from the average. On the news day, the market shows a (further) 
decline, which is only significant at a 10% level. Finally, on the day after the event, the 
market becomes bullish, showing a significant and above average performance. Hence, 
although effects are less significant in general, we find a similar dynamic structure for the 
impact of bad news on stock markets than on bond markets.  
  
Stability of estimated model over time 
Figure 2 displays the out-of-sample performance of the equation. It is apparent from 
the graph that no violation of the hypothesis of stable parameters occurs. Note, however, that 
the confidence band is much wider compared to the one of the bonds equation in Figure 1. 
Next, we study in-sample stability and changes in correlations over time. As in the 
case of bond markets, we test the influence of yearly dummies. We find that 1998 is 
characterized by a low daily rate of return on stocks, significant at the 5% level. However, 
testing all yearly dummies jointly, we cannot reject that they are equal to zero (Chi
2(7) = 
10.1). Thus, the time effects are not very strong.  
  Focusing on the international integration of Russian stock markets, we investigate the 
impact of the U.S. stock market. As before, we interact the S&P index with the yearly 
dummies and include these, instead of the original S&P variable, in the model shown in Table 
3. Opposite to the bond market results, we cannot reject that in every year the U.S. influence 
was the same at a 5% level (Chi
2(6) = 10.5). We hence conclude that, while 1998 was a bad 
year for Russian stock markets too, this did not significantly affect the coefficient of the S&P 
variable.  
Considering the Russian financial crisis again, we include a step dummy from 
September 1998 onwards. This variable and the interaction variable based on this dummy and 
the S&P index are not found statistically significant at a 5% level. 
Applying the EBRD indicator for financial liberalization (see Table 5) again, we find 
that it is insignificant when included alone in the model of Table 3. However, when it is 
interacted with the S&P variable, it shows a positive and significant coefficient at a 5% level. 
The original S&P index is no longer significant. In addition, we cannot reject that the 
coefficients for the financial liberalization index itself and the original S&P index returns are 
equal to zero (Chi
2(2) = 0.34). When we include the interacted S&P index alone, it displays a 
coefficient of 0.27 and a t-value of 7.44. We thus conclude that the degree of financial  
liberalization determines the extent to which the U.S. stock markets influence Russian stock 
markets.  
As in the case of bond markets, we decompose the impact of financial liberalization 
(see Table 5). When we include the two financial liberalization sub-indices in the model as 
well as their interaction terms with the S&P index, we discover that the interaction with 
banking reform is significant at the 5% level. The original S&P variable is no longer 
significant. A test of exclusions for both financial liberalization sub-indices, the S&P variable 
interacted with the non-banking index, and the original S&P variable is not rejected at the 5% 
level (Chi
2(4) = 5.1). Including the S&P variable as an interacted term with the banking 
reform sub-index alone in the model yields a coefficient of 0.29 and a t-value of 7.43. Hence, 
compared to the results for bond markets, we find that it is the degree of banking reform and 
interest rate liberalization that affects the impact of international stock markets on Russian 
stock markets.  
It should be further noted that interacting any of the other variables in our model in 
Table 3 does not yield any interesting conclusions.  
 
Further robustness checks 
As for bond markets, we check the hypothesis that oil price volatility may influence 
stock market returns. Again, none of our indicators for oil price volatility shows a significant 
influence on returns.  
It is interesting to look at the impact of the trading volume on stock markets, as order 
flows have been discovered as being an important information element in explaining 
movements in financial markets (see O’ Hara, 1995 and Lyons, 2001). We cannot use the 
trading volume variable in levels, because the volume data in levels is not stationary.
18 
Therefore, we use the growth rate of the volume of trading. First, putting this variable into the 
                                                 
18 To economize with respect to space, we do not include the full output in the paper. Full estimation results are 
available upon request.   
returns equation does not yield any statistically significant results (robust t-value = 1.44). 
There is one big outlier; trade on 28 December 1995 was unusually low, resulting in a growth 
rate of 3200%. We neutralize the impact of  this observation by using a dummy for this date 
and find that now growth in trading volume now has a significantly positive impact on stock 
returns (robust t-value = 4.21**). The size of the estimated coefficient implies that an increase 
in trading volume by one percentage point raises stock returns by 0.006%. Given an average 
of about 17% for trade growth, this indicates an increase in stock returns by 0.10 percentage 
points.
19  
Note, however, that causality may also run from volume to prices. To circumvent this 
problem, as well as the potential endogeneity bias, we include the lagged value of the trading 
volume in estimations, instead of the current one. This leads to a less significant estimate 
(robust t-value = 2.15*) and a lower coefficient (0.001). Overall, we interpret the findings as 
supporting the view that trading volume contains valuable information for stock markets, 
supporting the implications of the microstructure models. A thorough analysis of these effects 
requires a higher frequency data analysis, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Second, when the trading volume variable is included in the variance equation, we 
find that a higher growth in trading volume leads to a highly significant increase in the 
volatility of stock returns (robust t-value = 5.33**). This result is not sensitive to including 
the dummy variable for 28 December 1995 as discussed above. This implies that the 
estimated conditional variance will be smaller on average when the trading volume variable is 
included. In contrast to our analysis of trade volume on returns, the lagged value of the trade 
volume growth is not significant in the variance equation (robust t-value = 1.74)  
 
                                                 
19 Using squared values of the trading volume growth rate in the variance equation does not lead to converging 
estimates.   
VII. Conclusions   
This paper analyzes Russian financial markets using daily returns on stock and bond 
markets over the period September 1995 to November 2001. In both markets, movements in 
the U.S. stock market index Granger-cause Russian returns. This finding indicates that 
Russian markets have become dependent on developments in global financial markets. 
However, there was a decline in the degree of globalization of Russian markets after the 1998 
crisis. A more detailed analysis reveals that the international influence on Russian financial 
markets depends upon the degree of financial liberalization. We find that a higher degree of 
financial liberalization is associated with a stronger impact of U.S. stock returns on Russian 
financial markets. We also decompose the impact of financial liberalization. While banking 
reform and interest rate liberalization efforts seem to be more important for the globalization 
of Russian stock markets, it is the progress in liberalizing securities markets and non-bank 
financial institutions that matters more for the globalization of Russian bond markets. 
However, a more detailed examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this study. 
Our finding that the Russian stock market is sensitive to oil price suggests that oil 
price movements may significantly destabilize Russian markets. International investors may 
diversify such risks by investing in other emerging markets that are not as dependent on rich 
energy resources as Russia. Regarding the effect of information arrival on financial market 
returns, there is considerable evidence for energy news playing an important role on bond 
markets. We do not find, however, a statistically significant impact of news from the war in 
Chechnya on financial markets. Thus, financial markets clearly differentiate between different 
types of news. Although energy news are priced in the markets, an event as widely publicized 
in the international press as the Chechnya war does not seem to have much of an influence on 
both bond and stock markets. It is also of interest to note that news does not appear to 
influence the volatility on financial markets. We also find evidence that order flows help to 
explain Russian financial market returns as well as, though less robustly, volatility. This is in  
line with a strongly developing literature pointing towards the microstructure of markets as an 
important determinant in the development of financial market series. However, for a more 
precise analysis of the issue, intraday data would be needed. 
Our results indicate that further liberalization and deepening of Russian markets will 
likely result in increased financial market co-movements between Russian and global 
markets. However, the decrease in financial liberalization that occurred in Russia after 1998 
implies that at least for the moment it can still serve as a market that allows U.S. investors to 
reduce portfolio risk through diversification. However, over time, other transition economies, 
such as those in the central and eastern Europe, may provide a better alternative for 
diversification. The correlations of the latter markets with the U.S. is expected to be relatively 
low, as the latter are the candidate countries for the European Union and, thus, may be more 
influenced by financial markets in the Euro area than by U.S. markets.
20  
 
                                                 
20 Gilmore and McManus (2002) examine the correlations between the U.S. stock and central European markets. 
They find no significant long run relationship. Their evidence also indicates that the U.S. market does not 
Granger-cause any of the European markets.  
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Table 1: Defining news categories 
Category  Definition  No. of cases 
Energy:   
Energy  good  news  Announcements, actions, or events with positive 
implications for the energy sector 
7
Energy  neutral  news    Announcements, actions, or events relating to 
energy with neither obvious good or bad impli-
cations 
14
Energy  bad  news  Announcements, actions, or events with negative 
implications for the energy sector 
5
Chechnya:   
War good news  Announcements, actions, or events that imply either 
Russian gains or an ending of the conflict 
17
War  neutral  news  Announcements of Russian or Chechen military 
actions 
28
War bad news  Announcements, actions, or events that imply either 
Russian losses or a continuation of the conflict 
17
  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of daily returns (growth rates in %) 
 Mean  St.Dev.  Min  Max  Skewness  Excess  kurtosis 
Russian  bonds  0.08 2.64 -25.78  23.33 -0.32  2.64 
Russian stocks   0.06  3.45  -19.03  16.83  -0.07  3.49 
U.S.  bonds  -0.03 0.10  -4.75 4.84  0.19  2.03 
U.S.  stocks    0.05  1.17 -6.87  5.12 -0.07  2.63 
Oil  price  0.01 2.51 -20.04  17.65 -0.06  5.86 
Notes: The sample period is 1 September 1995 to 30 November 2001, with a total of 1388 consistent 
observations.   
Table 3: Explaining returns using a GARCH (1,1) model with t-distributed errors 
  Bond returns  Stock returns 
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
α0  0.02** 0.01 0.55** 0.21
α1  0.07** 0.02 0.24** 0.06
β1  0.90** 0.02 0.73** 0.06
Student-t degrees of freedom (ν)  5.1 6.8 
Threshold 0.08* 0.03  
Constant 0.12** 0.03  
Dummy 10/23/1997  -3.13** 0.03 -4.20**  0.12
Bond returnt-1 0.09** 0.03 0.12*  0.05
Stock returnt-1 0.11**  0.03
Stock returnt-6 0.05  0.03
S&P returnt-1 0.20** 0.03 0.52**  0.08
Oil price growth ratet-1 0.08**  0.03
Energy neutral news  0.23 0.31 -0.08  0.86
Energy good news  1.04** 0.23 -0.71  0.50
Energy bad news  -1.00** 0.26 -1.12  0.74
War neutral news   0.31 0.27 0.36  0.49
War good news  -0.28 0.21 -0.49  0.49
War bad news  -0.04 0.28 0.13  0.56
Number of observations  1347  1347 
Log-likelihood -2535.5  -3337.2 
Normality test  Chi
2(2) = 2574**  Chi
2(2) = 69.5** 
ARCH 1-2 test  F(2, 1328) = 0.03  F(2, 1327) = 2.36 
Portmanteau test  Chi
2(25) = 17.7  Chi
2(25) = 35.8 
Notes: * (**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent.  
 
Table 4: Explaining returns using a plus/minus one day news window 
  Bond returns  Stock returns 
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
α0  0.02 0.01 0.54* 0.23
α1  0.07** 0.02 0.25** 0.07
β1  0.90** 0.02 0.73** 0.07
Student-t degrees of freedom (ν)  5.1 6.7 
Threshold 0.08* 0.04  
Constant 0.12** 0.03  
Dummy 10/23/1997  -3.12** 0.04 -4.19  0.16
Bond returnt-1 0.09** 0.03 0.11*  0.06
Stock returnt-1 0.11**  0.03
Stock returnt-6 0.05  0.03
S&P returnt-1 0.20** 0.03 0.53**  0.08
S&P returnt-2  
Oil price growth ratet-1 0.08**  0.03
Energy neutral newst-1 0.03 0.43 0.23  0.58
Energy neutral newst 0.24 0.31 0.05  0.82
Energy neutral newst+1 -0.10 0.40 0.55  0.58
Energy good newst-1 0.01 0.19 -0.43  1.20
Energy good newst 1.04** 0.21 -0.74  0.53
Energy good newst+1 -0.41* 0.17 -1.16  0.74
Energy bad newst-1 -0.54** 0.11 -1.33  0.84
Energy bad newst -0.99** 0.21 -1.21  0.66
Energy bad newst+1 0.72** 0.13 0.73*  0.29
Continues on next page 
Table 4 continued 
War neutral newst-1 0.03 0.21 0.07  0.46
War neutral newst   0.24 0.28 0.34  0.53
War neutral newst+1 0.21 0.23 0.18  0.51
War good newst-1 0.11 0.17 -0.41  0.50
War good newst -0.29 0.19 -0.61  0.57
War good newst+1 0.33 0.23 1.05  0.67
War bad newst-1 0.33 0.29 -0.09  0.46
War bad newst -0.02 0.28 0.26  0.59
War bad newst+1 0.25 0.33 0.45  0.62
Number of observations  1351  1346 
Log-likelihood -2537.5  -3330.2 
Normality test  Chi
2(2) = 2579**  Chi
2(2) = 69.2** 
ARCH 1-2 test  F(2, 1320) = 0.02  F(2, 1314) = 2.46 
Portmanteau test  Chi
2(25) = 16.8  Chi
2(25) = 34.6 
Notes: * (**) indicates significance at a 5% (1%) level. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity-consistent.  
Table 5: EBRD Financial liberalization index 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Financial  liberalization  2.00 2.50 2.67 1.84 1.67 1.67 1.67 
Banking reform and  
interest rate liberalization  
2.00 2.00 2.33 2.00 1.67 1.67 1.67 
Securities markets and  
non-bank financial institutions  
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